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Abstract
By engaging the colonial factor in African confl icts, this article seeks to 
understand the ineffectiveness of efforts at confl ict management in overcoming 
the disasters that brought the confl icts to the African continent. It claims 
that confl ict in Africa does not always stem primarily from crises of national 
governance and the failure of governmental institutions in African countries to 
mediate confl ict, and revisits the colonial factor as the root of many confl icts in 
Africa. The article reconsiders the confl ict management and confl ict resolution 
debate and indicts former colonial powers and powerful organisations for 
maintaining colonial-style approaches to African confl icts at the expense of a 
desire to address the fundamental issues that divide the parties to the different 
confl icts. It argues that the colonial factor ought to be a consideration in attempts 
to address African confl icts because the roots of many post-colonial confl icts in 
Africa remain buried in Africa’s past and, specifi cally, in the colonisation and 
de-colonisation processes. Making the claim that confl ict resolution is more 
than the suppression or perhaps the elimination of overt violence, it argues 
that envisaging and/or imposing peace-keeping forces at every turn on various 
African confl icts does not provide the desired durable outcomes.
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I am sure that none of you would want to rest content with the superficial 
kind of social analysis that deals mainly with effects and does not grapple with 
underlying causes (Martin Luther King Jr 1963).
The conflict resolution community seems to pursue conflict resolution efforts in 
Africa from a variety of purposes and interests and with policies that are often 
replete with ambiguities and contradictions. This situation may be the reason 
why many African conflicts may be silenced but remain largely unresolved. 
As Zartman (2000:3) has pointed out, although African conflicts involve 
the activities of seasoned peacemakers using the best of personal skills and 
recently developed knowledge about ways of managing and resolving conflicts, 
international efforts at conflict management have not been particularly effective 
or efficient in overcoming the disasters that have brought them to the continent. 
The critical question then is how we understand the problem of conflict 
resolution in Africa when the actors, mainly external to Africa, propagate the 
idea of peace and conflict resolution corresponding mainly to their own interests 
and view of Africa and the world.
Although some scholars on conflict in Africa (Obasanjo 1991, Anyang’ Nyong’o 
1991 and Msabaha 1991) agree that conflict in Africa stems primarily from 
crises of national governance and from the failure of governmental institutions 
in African countries to mediate conflict, this article engages the colonial factor 
as the root of many conflicts in Africa. It argues that this factor must be taken 
into consideration in the attempts to address African conflicts because the 
roots of many post-colonial conflicts in Africa, such as the recent case of South 
Sudan, remain buried in Africa’s past and, specifically, in the colonisation and 
de-colonisation processes. The article also argues that conflicts at sub-national 
and national levels in Africa are of several types, and that imposing peace-
keeping forces as has often been the case, or merely imposing new political and 
economic institutions on the various African conflicts, may not provide the 
desired durable outcomes. Furthermore, and based on the same premise, the 
article questions how far a just and equitable future can be structured on an 
unjust past. 
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The Colonial legacy as basis of conflict
Some scholars, including Mokwugo Okoyo (1977), Bonny Duala-M’Bedy 
(1984), Claude Ake (1985) and Herman J. Cohen (1995), consider the numerous 
conflicts in Africa as a natural consequence of Africa’s colonial past. Okoyo 
(1977:93), for example, posits that ‘political instability is rooted in the very 
structure of society and, for most new countries, in the colonial past’. He also 
adds that ‘Africa’s post-colonial present can be said to have been fashioned for 
Africa by Africa’s colonial past’. Subscribing to this viewpoint, Ambassador 
Herman J. Cohen (1995) asserted that ‘the sources and consequences of Africa’s 
internal conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the subsequent processes of 
de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation building’. 
For Cohen, the colonial state was fraught with contradictions. As he put it, 
‘The modern African state was created by colonial powers out of ethnic and 
regional diversities, and rendered conflictual by gross inequities in power 
relations, and in the uneven distribution of national wealth and development 
opportunities’ (Cohen 1995:11). In other words, the basis had been created for 
many of the conflicts experienced in post-independence Africa. Duala-M’Bedy 
(1984:10), subscribing to this viewpoint, asserted that ‘the problems being 
experienced by modern African States are based on our colonial experience’.
Cohen (1995:11) also indicted the de-colonisation process when he observed 
that in many countries the contradictions of the colonial state were passed 
on to the independent states through a flawed process of de-colonisation. 
He argued that ‘conflict, recurring instability, and bad governance in Zaire, 
Rwanda, and Burundi can be traced back to the hasty and unprepared granting of 
independence by Belgium in 1960’. He also considered the major wars in Angola 
and Mozambique as arising out of ‘panic de-colonisation from a revolutionary 
and chaotic Portugal in 1974-75’. Insofar as the war in Sudan was concerned, he 
traced it to ‘the manner in which the Anglo-Egyptian administration brought 
the North and the South together, but kept them apart under a separatist 
policy for most of the Condominium rule, and then left them in a centralized 
unitary state without constitutional guarantees for the disadvantaged South’ 
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(Cohen 1995:12). These are only some examples of the conflicts in Africa which 
General Obasanjo (1991) described aptly as the continent with the greatest number 
of conflicts. 
It is important to underscore that, like the afore-mentioned conflict cases, the 
roots of many current conflicts – latent and manifest – including the cases 
of Western Sahara and British Southern Cameroons, can also be traced to 
colonialism and the de-colonisation process. This being the case, any thinking 
which regards the colonial factor as irrelevant today may be misplaced. The need 
for a colonial analysis remains pertinent because the workings of colonialism’s 
culture are still with us and because post-coloniality is highly engaged with 
colonialism (Thomas 1994). As this scholar of colonialism’s culture has argued, 
‘[I]f we had transcended colonial images and narratives more comprehensively, 
perhaps we would not need to discuss them at all, but there is no emptiness 
at present in which such a confident silence can be heard’ (Thomas 1994:195). 
In the case of British Southern Cameroons, for example, the United Kingdom 
(UK) failed to nurture a United Nations (UN) Trust Territory to Statehood in 
accordance with the UN Trusteeship Agreement. Rather, the UK lobbied the 
UN to hastily lump together British Southern Cameroons and a Trust Territory 
of France without constitutional guarantees for the disadvantaged former 
British Territory of Southern Cameroons. While the on-going Western Sahara 
conflict is about the right of self-determination afforded other former European 
dependencies, the conflicting situation in Côte d’Ivoire following the death of 
the country’s first President, Houphouet Boigné, is also closely associated with 
the nature of the country’s independence and political leadership.
Cohen’s assertion has a major implication for understanding the various 
conflicts and the attempts to resolve such conflicts on the continent. If the 
causes and consequences of the conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the 
processes of de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of 
nation-building, then any attempt to resolve the conflicts must also transcend 
the concepts of ‘new institutions that will increase participation, legitimacy, 
and redistribution’ and ‘good governance’ (Cohen 1993:7) recipes to also 
address other root causes of the problems. From the perspective of this analysis, 
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the ‘crises of internal governance’ and ‘new institutions’ in Africa can both be 
traced to the colonisation and the de-colonisation of Africa. Any discussion 
of ‘internal or national governance’ therefore cannot exclude the structure of 
the state and the political leadership as inherited from colonialism, given that 
the basis for African states and political leadership in most of the continent is 
colonial.
Bryson and Crosby (1992:3) defined leadership as the ‘inspiration and 
mobilization of others to undertake collective action in pursuit of the common 
good’. Considered from this standpoint, political leadership in many parts of 
Africa even today can hardly be said to be African leadership because it was, 
for the most part, imposed on the people by colonial powers. Okoyo (1977:93) 
described the situation in the following words: ‘Colonial rule was for all practical 
purposes military rule and by a simple transference the new political class which 
inherited the mantle of the colonial masters also inherited the latter’s concept of 
leadership role that was structured in authoritarian terms’. Examples are legion 
in Africa where the colonial machine did very little to prepare Africans for self-
rule and, consequently, for good governance. In any case, no self-rule had been 
envisaged in the first place, and so the only education dispensed to the ‘natives’ 
was just enough to prepare them for subordinate positions as messengers and 
junior clerks in the colonial civil service. A majority of African leaders and the 
people in leadership roles at independence were chosen by the colonial masters 
from among this group. Once in power, they held tight to power, and usually 
with the support of the former colonial powers who gave the power to them in 
the first place.
African independence and African political leadership can be seen to be very 
closely related. Former colonial masters were not in search of good leaders of the 
people. The concern of the colonial masters at independence and beyond, for the 
most part, was to hand power to a group of cronies whose mission was always 
not to ‘govern their people well’ but to protect the interests of the metropole. 
In this regard, many political leaders of Africa, especially those in the former 
French colonies, were and continued to be imposed upon the people with 
almost no consideration for good governance. As University of Port Harcourt’s 
Professor Claude Ake (1985:1212) put it, ‘the circumstances of African history 
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conspired to produce an elite which could not function because it had no sense 
of identity or integrity and no confidence, did not know where it was coming 
from or where it was going’. The examples of the military and economic pacts 
concluded by French-speaking African leaders with France at independence 
are cases in point. In many cases, these pacts have not been rescinded half a 
century after independence and that is why former French colonies either still 
have the French military stationed in the countries or continue to call on France 
for military intervention as in the recent cases of Central African Republic and 
Mali. Let us now consider the basis of African nations or states, and the concepts 
of power and governance.
Colonial rule, power and governance in Africa
In Africa, the concept of state or nation is based on Africa’s colonial past. Article 
4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union places emphasis on respect of 
state boundaries inherited at independence. African states have also remained 
spheres of influence of former colonial powers, and no power in the world has 
been interested in changing that situation. Duala-M’bedy (1984:10) asserted that 
‘the European concept of state has had a strong influence on African countries 
and that it was this concept of state that led to drawing up of arbitrary borders 
throughout Africa’. Such Eurocentric thinking, reinforced by technological and 
scientific achievements, is still very present in Africa. This is why most western 
literature on conflicts in Africa may still need further clarification in regard 
to specific conflict types. Some light will be shed on the typology of African 
conflicts later on in this analysis.
Political repression and non-respect for human rights are synonymous with 
bad governance. Political repression in Africa goes back to Africa’s colonial 
legacy. Colonial rule was the antithesis of democracy, because it was premised 
on the usurpation of the fundamental right of self-determination and of the 
fundamental human rights of citizens and peoples. Okoyo’s (1977) work 
underscored the fact that whatever legitimacy colonialism possessed was 
derived not from any set of agreed rules or consensus, but from the monopoly 
of the means of coercion and violence, and by its divide-and-rule strategies 
aimed at intensifying the cleavages (class, tribal, religious) inherent in the social 
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structure and at prolonging its rule. Colonial rule never raised the issue of good 
government. The only issues were power and violence, and that remains the 
tradition of politics that African leaders took to independence in their respective 
nations. These African leaders have not only retained the politics of power and 
violence, but many of them have also continued to reinforce the tradition. 
Ake (1985:1213) argued strongly that ‘because many leaders in Africa were 
insecure when they inherited power, they continued to cling tenaciously to the 
idea of the ruler’s exclusive claim to power’. This situation is verifiable in many 
African countries where leadership has been clinging to power for twenty, thirty 
or forty years – from Uganda and Sudan, through Chad and Cameroon, to 
Angola, Zimbabwe, and others. Power and bad governance, traditions inherited 
from colonial rule and the nature of de-colonisation, have been a major source 
of conflict in Africa. Although viewed in general terms as African conflicts, 
there is need to point out that conflict in Africa does not only vary from case 
to case, it is often traceable to colonial rule and the de-colonisation process. Let 
us now turn our attention to an examination of the various conflicts in order to 
categorise them.
Reconsidering African conflicts
Cohen’s analysis focused on violent conflict in Africa, but this included the 
violent way in which intolerant regimes usually deal with political problems that 
could have been resolved through the political process and without violence. Any 
realistic appreciation of post-colonial African conflicts must begin with their 
origins or causes. The literature on African conflicts appears to view the conflicts 
mainly in general terms as intra-national or inter-ethnic. This view holds good 
to some extent, but it is far from being the general trend. Cohen (1996:1) asserted 
that most ‘African wars were civil wars’, and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, for instance, also advanced the argument 
that ‘more than half of the major armed conflicts in Africa occurred within 
national boundaries’ (Lingren et al. 1991:347). The statement, ‘occurred within 
national boundaries’, is understood to mean the same as the umbrella description, 
‘intra-national’. Although the geo-political space in which a conflict occurs may 
be a nation-state, there is the need to make one clarification in this analysis. It is 
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that the conflicts occurring within a national boundary in Africa have different 
stakes and different root causes. The classification of African conflicts as mainly 
inter-ethnic and intra-national seems to have won great acceptance within the 
conflict resolution community. That classification, which appears to stem from 
Western knowledge of and consideration for African societies, may need to be 
expanded further. In this regard, an attempt to focus on the various types of 
conflicts in Africa from the standpoints of the subject or nature of the dominant 
issues involved in each category is important.
A close examination of the various conflicts occurring in Africa reveals two 
broad categories, namely intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Each of these two 
broad categories can be broken down further into what has been referred to 
as ‘relatively abstract dimensions of conflict’ (Kriesberg 1982:183; cf Burton 
1990). These dimensions, in Kriesberg’s words, include the issues in contention 
(resources and interests or values and ideology), the arenas in which the conflict is 
waged (families, communities, countries, or regions) and the contending parties 
(persons, organisations, classes, or peoples). In the light of these dimensions, 
we can consider African conflicts as belonging to the following six types: inter-
ethnic conflicts, inter-state conflicts, liberation conflicts, civil rights conflicts, 
annexationist conflicts, and political transition conflicts. Each conflict type is 
discussed briefly below with examples provided. 
1) Inter-ethnic conflicts: Opposing tribal or ethnic groups are mainly found 
within national boundaries although the inherent problems of artificial borders 
caused by colonialism have resulted in some ethnic groups being found in 
two, three or even more African countries. These conflicts are very recurrent 
although with less gravity in terms of the numbers of casualties, refugees 
and displaced persons, and the spread of disease, famine and environmental 
devastation. The examples of clan fighting in Somalia and Liberia where the 
control of power at the centre was/is one of the main issues are the high point 
of inter-ethnic conflicts, but these are only the exception and not the rule – 
given that inter-ethnic conflicts occur over any number of issues ranging from 
politics to socio-economic issues such as religion, culture or land and other 
scarce resources. Inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts abound in many countries 
of Africa. In post-colonial Africa, these conflicts are greatly exacerbated by 
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the neo-colonial arrangements that characterise many African governments. 
In many African countries where leadership remains in the same hands and 
continues to serve colonial interests, state apparatus are known to sponsor some 
inter-ethnic conflicts as a divide-and-rule strategy. 
2) Inter-state conflicts: These are conflicts between the governments and 
sometimes peoples of two different countries. These conflicts have been relatively 
few in Africa in spite of the problems caused by artificial borders inherited from 
colonialism and the lumping together of different nations to make up new 
countries at independence. Some inter-state conflicts have occurred mainly over 
disputed territories like the Chad-Libya conflict over the Aouzou strip. There 
was also the case of the Tanzania-Uganda war that toppled Idi Amin in Uganda. 
Others included the Kenya-Somali war (1963-1967), the Somali-Ethiopian 
conflict (1964-1978), the Egypt-Libya conflict (1977), the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
border conflict (1998-2000) and the 1994 Cameroon-Nigeria conflict over the 
disputed oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.
3) Liberation conflicts: Liberation conflicts are those conflicts that involve 
entire nations or peoples who find themselves within the territorial boundaries 
of given countries by colonial and colonising arrangements. Often, these people 
waged war to liberate themselves when they were unable, through dialogue and 
the political process, to correct what Cohen (1995) termed the contradictions of 
colonial rule in some cases, and the failures of de-colonisation in others. 
The people seeking to liberate themselves usually did not have any feelings 
of belonging and commitment and, consequently, were not concerned about 
sharing in the colonising country’s power and resources. These conflicts arose, 
rather, from the aspirations of a people to assert their fundamental human right 
of self-determination, as contained in the UN Charter. A few cases of liberation 
conflicts in Africa include the Eritrean War of independence; the South Sudan 
war; the Namibian War of independence; and the Cassamance conflict in Senegal. 
These conflicts are similar to the Quebec Sovereignty Question in Canada and 
the Chechnya conflict in Russia.
In Africa, however, it is sometimes difficult to classify these conflicts from a 
purely western standpoint in regard to the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in 
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international law. The point here, however, is that the people who seek to liberate 
themselves and their territory consider themselves as having been compelled by 
colonial forces to live with a different group, often with great incompatibilities 
as in the case of South Sudan and the others cited above. Some of these conflicts 
have been termed, albeit erroneously, as secessionist conflicts. 
4) Civil rights conflicts: Civil rights conflicts arise mainly over issues of 
participation, distribution, and legitimacy in the politics and governance of 
nations (Lasswell 1936). In civil rights conflicts, a section of a country may 
wage a conflict because the people (or a group) consider the social framework 
as structured to exclude or marginalise them, and therefore seek to correct the 
situation. Unlike liberation conflicts discussed above, civil rights conflicts always 
occur within the same nation. To a very large extent, the stakes are participation 
and distribution at the centre. The issue in civil rights conflicts is to give the 
people a fair share of their country’s power and resources, and thereby enhance 
their sense of belonging and commitment. Like the Civil Rights Movement in 
America, the people who wage civil rights struggles recognise that they too are 
part of a given country and only want to be recognised as such and to have the 
full right for a fair share. Some examples of civil rights conflicts in Africa are 
the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the struggle for majority rule in 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the Tuareg uprising in Mali, where the group found 
itself virtually estranged from national life, and the Algerian Berbers fighting 
against the ruling Arab class. To a considerable extent, Burundi and Rwanda also 
have some ingredients of civil rights conflicts. In this conflict type, the stakes 
are mainly those about who is where, who gets what, how and when (Lasswell 
1936). These conflicts have been the most widely known and studied of Africa’s 
conflicts. This category of conflict may be best addressed by new political and 
economic institutions and good governance – for instance, ‘power sharing 
through proportional representation and federal structures’ (Cohen 1993:7). 
Civil rights conflicts, when left unresolved, can escalate into civil wars as in 
Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Congo, Chad, Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
and Côte d’Ivoire. On the basis of the considerations described above, certain 
conflicts occurring within the national boundaries of given ‘nation-states’ 
should not be seen simply as intra-national conflicts or classified too quickly as 
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‘internal affairs of States’. This error has, very often, led to drastic consequences 
in Africa. The Eritrean Independence War was, until the country’s independence 
in 1993, erroneously considered as an internal affair of Ethiopia just as the war in 
South Sudan was for long considered as Sudan’s internal affair. The international 
community continues to make this error of judgment in the case of the Southern 
Cameroons Question (Annan 2000) and in considering the Western Sahara 
conflict not as a case of Moroccan irredentism against an indigenous desire for 
independence (Zunes and Mundy 2010:xxiii), but in considering the territory as 
part of Morocco.
5) Annexationist conflicts: Annexationist conflicts arise when one nation 
annexes another nation in part or wholly, or where two nations lock horns 
over interests that belong to neither of them from the point of view of history 
and international law. This class of conflict is a curious one, and there are not 
many examples on the African continent currently. Two cases, however, stand 
out prominently. These are the Western Sahara conflict involving Morocco and 
the British Southern Cameroons restoration of independence and sovereignty 
conflict in post-colonial Cameroon Republic. In both cases, Morocco and 
Cameroon Republic went beyond their borders to annex and ‘colonially occupy’ 
Western Sahara in 1975 and British Southern Cameroons in 1961 respectively, 
contrary to the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (United 
Nations General Assembly 1960), and the African Union Constitutive Act 
in its Article 4. Both the Western Sahara situation and the British Southern 
Cameroons’ case are examples of conflict caused by backdoor deals of colonial 
powers that effectively sold out the fundamental right of the people of those 
nations to determine their own destiny (McGovern 2010:xiii). Annexationist 
conflicts are similar to liberation conflicts because the nations so annexed and 
colonially occupied (often with the connivance of colonial forces) seek to liberate 
themselves and their territory. In spite of the condemnation of colonialism, 
in spite of the breach of international law, and in spite of the incompatibility 
theory of plural states espoused by Woodrow Wilson in 1919 (Esthus 1991) and 
other scholars including Walzer, Kantowicz and Higham (1982), Furnival (1986) 
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and Smith (1986), the world community does not only orphan these conflicts 
(Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2005), but considers them, albeit erroneously, as 
secessionist conflicts. 
The conflict between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République 
du Cameroun over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea is 
annexationist in type because the Bakassi Peninsula is said to belong neither 
to the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor to La République du Cameroun. 
The following facts on the conflict are contained in The London Communiqué 
of June 1995 (Southern Cameroons National Council 1995):
The Southern Cameroons was administered jointly with the Federation 
of Nigeria from 1919 to 1958 and during this period, all the survey maps 
which were prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands & Surveys in Lagos 
recognised the Bakassi Peninsula as being an integral part of Southern 
Cameroonian territory. The 1961 unification of the Southern Cameroons 
and La République du Cameroun gave rise to the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon, which did share a maritime border with Nigeria, with the 
Bakassi Peninsula becoming part of the Federal Republic of Cameroon ... 
Following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1972 
and the effective secession of La République du Cameroun from the union 
in 1984 and the symmetrical return of the Southern Cameroons to the 
status of a UN Trust Territory, that [sic] La République du Cameroun 
ceased to share a maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
The westernmost maritime boundary of La République du Cameroun is at 
the estuary of the Mungo River. At the same time, the people of Southern 
Cameroons consider that the present occupation of the Bakassi Peninsula by 
the Nigerian Army, though provoked by the hostile behaviour of gendarmes 
from La République du Cameroun, is entirely illegal. Consequently, the case 
which has been filed at the International Court of Justice against the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria by La République du Cameroun, and which is based 
on the presumption that it is the successor state to the defunct Federal 
Republic of Cameroun, has no foundation in International Law because La 
République du Cameroun has no locus standi in the Bakassi Peninsula ...
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This excerpt exposes some of the contradictions of colonialism and the process 
of de-colonisation which were always in keeping with the colonial culture of 
constructing non-Europeans as subhuman. Colonial administration did not 
only treat colonial subjects as too far behind to govern themselves (Thomas 
1994:152), but this consideration probably caused the colonial masters to treat 
colonised people as objects whom they pushed around as they knew how – 
as evidenced by this case of British Southern Cameroons. The curious nature 
of this kind of conflict is that the disputed territory belongs to neither of the 
warring parties in the conflict. Whereas in the Western Sahara Conflict, Algeria 
fought against Morocco alongside the indigenous Polissario Front, the Bakassi 
Peninsula belongs to neither of the two nations that claim the territory. This 
conflict is erroneously referred to as a border conflict between the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun whereas from a historico-
legal standpoint, the two neighbours did not share a common border anywhere 
near the disputed Bakassi Peninsula at independence in 1960.1 
In the case of British Cameroons, the nationalists consider that part of the 
strategy and the hidden agenda of ensuring the annexation of the British 
Southern Cameroons was, from the very beginning, a ploy of the United 
Kingdom and Western colonial powers to dispense with the territory. 
Considering the annexation and colonial occupation of British Cameroons as 
a colonial conspiracy masterminded by Britain and the West within the Cold 
War context to deprive the territory of its independence, British Southern 
Cameroons nationalists notified La République du Cameroun, the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations 
that the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to British Southern Cameroons.2
6) Political transition conflicts: Mainly within states, political transition 
conflicts arose in many African countries out of rising tensions resulting from 
a stalemated transition to the democratisation of political life in the 1990s. 
This phenomenon is described by Cohen (1996:6) as ‘blocked political systems 
1 East Timor formerly in Indonesia, and Tibet in China appear to belong to this 
conflict category.
2 See interpleader to the ICJ in the 1994 Bakassi Peninsula Case between the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun.
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that can no longer resolve individual or group differences through nonviolent 
procedures’. The case in Africa has been the transition to participatory 
democracy. Although the democratisation process has experienced some 
success in a few countries such as Benin and Botswana, and recently Ghana, 
South Africa, and Tanzania, the examples of many other African countries, 
including Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, 
are far from inspiring any hope for the future of democratic rule. The Zimbabwe 
political transition since independence and the Kenyan conflict arising from 
the last election and complicated by the charges of the Prime Minister and his 
Deputy by the International Criminal Court are other examples of political 
transition conflicts. In some of the cases mentioned above, violent conflict came 
about by the annulment of a free and fair democratic process and, in others, 
serious internal political violence began after what the people saw as flaws 
occasioned by heavily rigged elections, winners seeking to exclude some actors 
or whole sections of the country, or incumbents being unwilling to submit to 
the will of the people as expressed through the ballot box. In some other cases, 
these conflicts have not yet led to severe violence mainly because the situations 
were greatly repressed. However, Cohen (1996:6) cautioned that there is ‘great 
threat of severe violence in the near future’ in this area. What appears clear from 
the difficulty experienced in the political transitions in many of these countries 
is that the governance record is very akin to the colonial style of governance 
inherited in the respective countries. The leadership only replicated the colonial 
leadership style which was for all practical purposes military rule since it was 
structured mainly in authoritarian terms. Two decades and more after the 
democratic struggles started in the 1990s, these countries continue to be ruled 
by Presidential decree in spite of the existence of ‘democratic parliaments’ 
and plans to introduce ‘Senatorial’ processes. In the case of one of these ‘new 
African democracies’, the Senators were elected only by Councillors whose term 
of office had long elapsed. It was also curious in Cameroon to note that 30 of 
the 100 members of the Senate of the country were appointed by the President. 
These kinds of governance manoeuvres in a post-colonial situation remain 
consistent with the inherited tradition of political power and dominance of 
the colonial administration. As Thomas (1994:4) pointed out, modernity itself 
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can be understood as a colonialist project in the special sense that both the 
societies internal to Western nations, and those they possessed, administered 
and reformed elsewhere, were understood as objects to be surveyed, regulated 
and sanitised.
After cataloguing and categorising the different conflict types in post-
independence Africa, it may now be appropriate to highlight the debate on 
conflict resolution and conflict management, consider the main intervention 
agencies and examine the different approaches employed to deal with the 
different conflicts.
Conflict resolution or conflict management?
Stephen Ryan (1990:50) has asserted that too often conflict resolution is used 
as a cover-all term that fails to face up to the different processes involved in the 
reduction or elimination of violence. This statement seems to be very evident 
of the African conflict situation especially when scholars and practitioners alike 
refer to the handling of conflict in Africa. It is necessary to explore the main 
features of conflict resolution and conflict management, two approaches in 
conflict scholarship, in order to better understand and assess the motivations 
and actions of intervening agencies or actors. The first major difference between 
the two approaches concerns the desire or not to raise the fundamental issues 
that divide the parties to a conflict. Proponents of the resolution approach 
favour the raising of fundamental issues because they believe that conflict can 
be resolved. As Mitchell (1989:9) pointed out, not merely will disruptive conflict 
behaviour cease and hostile attitudes and perceptions at least be ameliorated, 
but the ultimate source of conflict (that is, the situation of goal incompatibility) 
will also be removed so that no unsatisfied goals remain to plague the future.
Proponents of the management approach, on the other hand, believe that 
attempts to resolve conflicts are unrealistic, so rather than dealing with basic 
issues, attention should be concentrated on ameliorating the symptoms of the 
conflict, and in this way reducing suffering (Ryan 1990:102). Scholars of the 
resolution approach argue that the unsolvable nature of a particular conflict is 
more apparent than real. They maintain that it may be incorrect to view conflicts 
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in zero-sum or win/lose terms, and that positive sum or win/win outcomes 
may be possible if we base our thinking on different assumptions. John Burton 
(1979; 1984; 1987; 1990), for example, calls for the adoption of a human needs 
approach, arguing for a paradigm shift in how we analyse conflicts. For Burton, 
most conflicts arise because one or more groups are denied their basic human 
needs as advanced by Galtung (2004), Doyal and Gough (1991) and others. 
The second major difference between the two approaches relates to the chances 
of obtaining a self-sustaining settlement or outcome. Light (1984:151) claimed 
that conflict resolution offers a more viable outcome to conflict, because it 
converts the conflict into a shared problem, setting up a process in which both 
sides participate equally in finding solutions which are acceptable to both and 
which, therefore, are self-sustaining. Those who advance the management 
approach argue rather that given the lack of a community of interest, the most 
that can be hoped for is the suppression or perhaps the elimination of overt 
violence. One wonders whether the latter view is not the basis for all the peace-
keeping forces prescribed for conflicts in Africa over the decades.
The third main difference concerns the role of the third party in responding 
to violence. Many proponents of the resolution approach tend not to believe 
in enforced settlements, a process upheld by proponents of the management 
school. In the resolution approach, the consent and contentment of the parties 
to a conflict are central. The solution to the conflict in this approach ought not 
to be imposed from outside. In this case, the third party plays a vital role, but 
only to the extent that the third party facilitates the interaction process. Edward 
de Bono (1985:76) popularised much of the thinking on how this can be done. 
As he put it:
In a conflict situation the two parties are unable to stand outside their own 
perceptions. In order to move from the argument to the design mode there 
is a need for a third party. The third party is not a go-between, negotiator 
or mediator. The third party acts as a mirror, an overview, a provider of 
provocation and creativity and a director of thinking.
While Burton (1979:120) on his part suggested that enforced settlement is not 
resolution of conflict, Groom (1986:86) also favoured the resolution of a conflict 
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above a settlement, arguing that resolution is not a settlement imposed by a 
victor or a powerful third party, but rather a new set of relationships freely and 
knowledgeably arrived at by the parties themselves.
This situation is different from the management of conflict viewpoint. 
Ryan (1990:105) has pointed out that even the term management implies a 
certain amount of arm-twisting, and to do this effectively power is required. 
The belief, according to Ryan, that basic issues cannot be resolved logically 
encourages the assumption that the natural state of affairs between the parties 
is conflict and that a third force is needed to ensure an acceptable degree of 
order and stability. This will have to take the form of a coercive intervention, 
sometimes by military or paramilitary forces; sometimes through economic 
measures. A review of conflict intervention in Africa over the decades reveals 
that conflict resolution in Africa has rather been about conflict management 
since it has focused mainly on a certain amount of arm-twisting and coercive 
intervention with military and para-military forces. Zartman (2000:2) has 
indicated that the United Nations Security Council deployed nine peace-keeping 
missions to Africa in the 1990s alone. 
The point in this analysis is that proponents of the management approach 
favour coercive interventions and are less scrupulous in seeking the consent of 
all the parties. Ryan (1990:106) cited the example of the London Conference of 
1959 which resulted in the independence of Cyprus to illustrate the point that 
in the management approach the third parties may try and impose a solution 
by working behind the backs or above the heads of one or more of the main 
contenders. He explained that Archbishop Makarios was forced by Britain and 
Greece to accept conditions he did not approve. In Africa, the idea of conflict 
resolution has been colonial in design and implementation in that the solutions 
are more often coercively imposed on the weaker parties. While former colonial 
powers have been largely involved in the former colonies, as in the recent case of 
the French military intervention in Mali, conflict management in the continent’s 
violent conflicts by former colonial powers has been coercive. Like the Cyprus 
situation, there are conflict cases in Africa in which powerful third parties have 
also worked behind the backs or above the heads of some contenders. In these 
situations, the focus has been on the use of power at the disposal of former 
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colonial states to impose whatever solution was in the interest of the intervening 
powerful third-parties (Webb, Koutrakou and Walters 1996; Skjelsbaek and 
Fermann 1996). Skjelsbaek and Fermann indicated that even in the mediations 
undertaken under the auspices of the UN, the actor in international relations 
supposedly with claims to impartiality and neutrality, these vested interest 
considerations seem to be in play always. One typical example is the treatment 
John Ngu Foncha and the Southern Cameroons received from the United 
Kingdom, the United Nations, France and La République du Cameroun in 1961 
(Munzu 1995:1). With the foregoing discussion on intervention approaches in 
African conflicts, one may want to inquire about the nature of the history of 
intervention in African conflicts.
Intervention actors and approaches
Intervention agencies or actors
A review of intervention efforts in African conflicts in the last two or three 
decades of the 20th century brings out two main trends in regard to the main 
actors or agencies and the intervention approaches involved. The first trend 
shows that the main actors intervening in African conflicts were almost entirely 
from outside of Africa. These were individuals, countries, groups of countries, 
institutions and organisations. As Herman Cohen pointed out, until 1993 Africa 
was almost totally dependent on outside entities for conflict management 
(1996:2). Some of these outside entities or actors included former colonial 
masters, international organisations and foreign powers like the United Nations, 
the European Community, and the United States of America; as well as regional 
efforts like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
West Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification 
(IGADD)3 in East Africa, and a number of non-governmental actors such as 
former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Julius Nyerere. The second strong idea 
that emerges from intervention literature is the increasing emphasis on conflict 
management rather than resolution as the intervention approach in Africa.
3 In 1996 the name of this Organisation was changed to Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD).
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Conflicts in the different sub-regions of Africa
From the examples provided earlier, one can affirm that the conflict management 
approach has been the dominant approach in African conflicts. Examples taken 
from the different sub-regions of Africa are illustrative. In East Africa, the 
war in South Sudan, the collapse of the State in Somalia, and the conflicts in 
Rwanda and Burundi, the situation in Ethiopia as well as the wars in former 
Zaire, are significant examples of protracted conflicts. These conflicts were 
only addressed superficially, their intensity notwithstanding. In spite of all the 
urgency concerning the conflict in Burundi, the focus was mainly on diplomatic 
interventions by several agencies and actors. These interventions ended up with 
the establishment of War Crime Tribunals with none of the actors giving any 
consideration for the need to address the deep concerns of the parties in the 
conflict. The tribunals seem to have been intended for punishing individuals 
chosen for destruction by the powerful stakeholders rather than for unearthing 
the causes of conflict that remain deeply rooted in the respective societies. It is 
difficult to imagine how the War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda helped to bring 
justice to the situation bred, for instance, by colonialism and the de-colonisation 
process in Burundi and Rwanda. The case was not different in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. 
In the case of the intractable fratricidal war in South Sudan, intervention was 
mainly intermittent from 1990 and undertaken by the Djibouti-based IGADD/
IGAD. In spite of the colonial basis of this conflict, it was difficult for many years 
to state any willingness on the part of the agencies to seek a lasting solution 
by addressing the profound causes of conflict. Cohen (1996:4) summed it all 
when he affirmed that East Africa in general was a sub-region where neither the 
African Unity (AU) nor the international community had been able to advance 
conflict management significantly beyond humanitarian intervention.
In West Africa, ECOWAS has, since 1990, been involved in peace-keeping 
operations. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were two situations in 
which ECOWAS sent in troops with financial and material support from the 
international community, notably the United States (Cohen 1996). In spite of 
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the huge cost of the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in terms of human lives and 
material, the peace-keeping interventions focused mainly on achieving what 
these actors termed ‘peace and stability’ (Cohen 1996:6). 
Intervention by individual external powers
As stated earlier, former colonial powers have been involved in the efforts 
to address conflicts in Africa. Some of these efforts undertaken in the 
1990s included negotiations between Angola’s factions coordinated by the 
Portuguese in 1990-1992; the mediation efforts of the Italians in the civil war in 
Mozambique during 1991-1993; and the efforts of the United States with regard 
to Ethiopia in 1990-1991 and Somalia in 1992-1993. The United States, within 
the framework of the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994, engaged with the 
then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in an effort to get the Organisation’s 
conflict management mechanism off the ground. French intervention in post-
colonial African conflicts came mainly under the umbrella of the European 
Union. France and Britain also sponsored a number of conferences in 1994-
1995 in some African capitals to facilitate dialogue on the development of 
consensus on conflict management policy along specific lines, including inter 
alia the development of conflict management approaches tailored to African 
circumstances under African leadership. France also provided funding through 
the Paris-based multilateral Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation 
(ACCT) for launching a West African ‘Observatory’ or watchdog based in 
Dakar, Senegal, to focus on 1) prevention and settlement of conflicts and 2) 
democratic transition in West Africa. France also supported the development 
of an inventory of available military assets in West Africa for an eventual AU 
and/or a sub-regional peace-keeping contingent (Cohen 1996:5). France also 
intervened militarily in some of her former colonies such as Côte d’Ivoire 
(2003 and 2010), Chad (2008), Mali (2013) or in the Central African Republic, 
the claim being to achieve what became known as ‘peace and stability’ rather than 
to resolve the respective conflicts by proceeding with both sides participating 
equally in finding solutions acceptable to both and, therefore, self-sustaining.
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International organisations
The international organisations involved in African conflicts are mainly the UN 
and the OAU/AU. The UN, for instance, has intervened in African conflicts since 
independence as in the case of Congo Leopoldville or Kinshasa. In the last two 
decades of the 20th century, the UN intervened in Mozambique’s Civil War; the 
Angolan Civil War; the Namibian Independence Conflict; Western Sahara, and 
the Rwandan genocide of April to July 1994. The bulk of these interventions 
were in the form of peace-keeping. The report of a former Secretary-General 
of the UN on this subject is pertinent to this analysis. In his annual report on 
peace-keeping to the General Assembly, Boutros Ghali noted his exploration 
of the possibility of building up a stockpile of military equipment in Africa 
(mostly leftovers from terminated UN peace-keeping operations) for use on 
short notice by African contingents (Cohen 1996:6). This remark by the UN 
Secretary-General illustrated the superficial approach employed by the world 
body in regard to conflicts in Africa.
The OAU on its part was, until 1990, virtually non-responsive to African 
conflicts because of its sacrosanct doctrine of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member states. William J. Foltz and I. William Zartman, two experts on 
the work of the Organisation, viewed the non-intervention situation and shared 
their views with regard to OAU’s non-intervention. While Zartman (1984:41) 
considered that there is no OAU in matters of African conflict; there are only 
members and their interests come first, Foltz (1991:349) viewed the OAU as 
most conservative having six of the seven principles enumerated in Article III 
of its Charter designed to serve in part or in whole to protect the autonomy 
of member states from interference or coercion by other members or by the 
Organisation as a whole. In keeping with the instructions from African Heads 
of State and Governments, the OAU conflict management mechanism tried 
to intervene in conflicts such as the one in the Republic of the Congo in 1993 
following the 1992 democratic election problems, and the conflict in Burundi 
after the assassination of a President in October 1993 was followed by instability 
and massive violence. Such OAU intervention has not been different from the 
examples of the UN. Like the UN, the OAU has mainly emphasised the conflict 
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management approach consisting of peace-keeping forces to reduce or eliminate 
violence rather than the desire to address the fundamental issues which divide the 
parties to the conflict. Stationing peace-keeping forces as in the Central African 
Republic (1996), Sudan (2004-2006, related to the Darfur conflict) or in Somalia 
(2007) can only be a temporary measure rather than a ‘conflict resolution’ 
approach. Whatever the case, OAU intervention through peace-keeping has 
been seriously bogged down by three fundamental principles: namely, non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states, territorial integrity, and 
inviolability of the boundaries inherited from colonisation (Cohen 1996:2-3). 
In addition to these fundamental problems of principle, other problems continue 
to be a challenge to AU peace-keeping missions. Some of these obstacles include 
inadequate trained troops, funding, and political willpower among AU nations 
to effectively intervene in all of Africa’s conflicts. From a conflict resolution 
standpoint, the critique by Feldman (2008:267) that ‘without strong AU military 
forces capable of providing effective interventions, many African conflicts will 
either remain unresolved or depend on forces outside the continent to attempt 
to impose a non-African solution on them’ is misplaced because military forces 
do not ‘resolve conflict’; they only succeed in some cases to reduce the violence. 
Conflict resolution is more than making or keeping peace.
The international community
One can safely state that the international community was, toward the end of 
the 20th century, responsive to the African conflict situation if one considers the 
number of seminars and conferences organised around the theme of conflict 
management in Africa as a reliable indicator. The general tendency was for 
donor governments to support capacity-building in the continent to deal with 
its conflicts. Apart from the US, the leaders of this conflict management support 
were France and Britain – Western governments with colonial, economic and 
political stakes and the longest history of military-to-military relations in 
the continent (Cohen 1996:4). From the foregoing, it is evident that ‘conflict 
resolution’ in Africa has been colonial in some form whether it was designed 
and implemented by individuals, countries, groups of countries, institutions 
or organisations.
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Conclusion
This article set out to engage the colonial factor in conflict and conflict resolution 
in Africa and to revisit the colonial dominance in Africa’s post-coloniality. 
It argued that numerous conflicts in post-colonial Africa have their roots in 
colonialism and the failure of the de-colonisation process, and also that the effort 
to resolve African conflicts may not have been very successful (Zartman 2000:3) 
because of the colonial considerations of intervening powers and organisations 
and the approach in use. The article claims that the realities of Africa’s colonial 
past that are very determinant on the continent’s post-colonial situation are 
profoundly important not only for scholars of African conflicts, but also for 
practitioners who intervene in search of solutions. Attempts to resolve any of 
the conflicts must consequently not continue to ignore these underlying causes. 
Efforts to ‘manage’ the conflicts are not likely to produce lasting resolution as 
shown by the recurrent stalemated nature of Somalia, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Western Sahara, and British Southern Cameroons among many 
others. The ‘new institutions and good governance’ recipe advocated by some 
practitioners, is a limited prescription.
The typology of African conflicts highlighted in the article could surely be 
greatly enriched by a careful exploration of the various conflict types viewed 
from the perspective of the different issues in contention. Conflicts in each 
category will only be satisfactorily resolved when they are addressed in relation 
to their specific root causes. The point at issue is that there are different types 
of conflicts in Africa. Consequently, each conflict needs to be analysed on its 
own merits and addressed as a specific case rather than using the strait-jacket 
peace-keeping approach in every conflict as has been the case for decades. 
Whether the emphasis is in 1) forced assimilation, 2) repression, whereby 
armies have been imposed on conflicting parties, 3) avoidance to frustrate the 
aspirations of seemingly less powerful or less organised parties, or 4) suppression 
of overt physical violence, the interventions have been coercive, and coercive 
interventions are only impositions of the powerful. From the standpoint of this 
article, these different options externally imposed, usually by working behind 
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the backs or above the heads of one or more of the parties involved in conflict, 
have had colonial underpinnings, such as arrangements without the consent and 
cooperation of the parties or of some of them.
While the consensus on intervention in African conflicts has mainly favoured 
the conflict management approach along the specific lines of power and military 
force through peace-keeping in different conflict locations, the language used also 
appeared to be colonially cavalier as in the concept known as ‘the development 
of conflict management approaches tailored to African circumstances …’. 
Although conflict situations are always specific, attempts to resolve the different 
conflicts ought to be about the desire to raise and address the fundamental 
issues that divide the parties to a conflict rather than the simple desire to reduce 
or eliminate violence as has been the case.
The foregoing are some of the complex and deep-rooted concerns which must 
be addressed in conflict resolution efforts in Africa. It will be difficult for the 
conflict resolution community to see its way around these concerns without 
a renewed openness to address Africa’s colonial past. If the conflict resolution 
community is to have any chance of reaching durable outcomes to the conflicts 
in Africa, it has to look beyond the narrow assumptions on which it has usually 
operated. The policy of the blind eye is just as inadequate as imposing an army 
of occupation on a given people or nation in conflict, as has been the case in 
several conflicts in Africa. Equally, the AU idea to set up an African Peace Keeping 
Force as outlined by the UN-organised Millennium Summit in September 
2000 can only produce colonial-style repressive measures rather than provide 
durable outcomes to Africa’s conflicts. By envisaging peace-keeping forces in 
the 21st century, the AU leadership may be making the error of keeping Africa 
in the colonial mindset while the rest of the world advances in the democratic 
respect of dialogue and human and people’s rights in the resolution of conflicts. 
The question remains whether there is the political will at the African Union, 
the United Nations, and among former colonial powers to move beyond the 
colonial-style desire to merely suppress or perhaps eliminate overt violence.
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